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Abstract
How much can governments shift the cost of their expenditure from today’s voters to
tomorrow’s generations of immigrants, without resorting to taxation that is explicitly dis-
criminatory? I demonstrate that if their societies are absorbing continuous flows of new
immigrants, we should expect governments that represent the interests of today’s popu-
lation to choose policies that shift some portion of the tax burden to the future, even if
that population is altruistically linked to future generations. To measure the deficit bias, I
analyse the dynamic behavior of an optimal growth model with overlapping dynasties and
factor taxation, calibrated for the US economy, and consider the welfare implications for
today’s population and their descendants of intertemporal shifts in the tax rates on labour
and capital as well as transfer payments. Models with overlapping infinite-lived dynasties
allow for a very clear distinction between natural population growth (an increase in the size
of existing dynasties) and immigration (the addition of new dynasties). They also provide
an alternative to the strict dichotomy between models with overlapping generations, where
agents disregard the impact of their choices on future generations, and the quasi-Ricardian
world of infinite-lived dynasties with representative agents that fully participate in both
the economy and the political system in every period. The trajectory of the debt burden
predicted by the model is a good match for the rise in US Federal Government debt since
the early 1980’s, as well as the increases in debt projected by the Congressional Budget
Office over the next few decades.
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1 Introduction
Ordinarily, in an economy in which taxes are distortionary, heavy reliance on deficit finance to
fund government expenditure combined with sustained increases in unfunded liabilities, relative
to the size of the economy, might be hard to reconcile with the prescriptions of optimal fiscal
policy. This is particularly the case if the very high tax rates that will ultimately be needed to
finance the increasing burden of debt are associated with significant excess burdens. Yet it is
precisely these types of fiscally imbalanced policies that both national and local governments
throughout much of the developed world have been pursuing for decades. This paper examines
how the existence of immigrant flows may encourage a government to favor deficit finance and
low taxes for long periods of time, even if such policies will eventually necessitate far higher tax
rates in the future, to finance the accumulated debt alongside other public expenditures.
In this paper I demonstrate that if their societies are absorbing new immigrants, we should
expect governments that represent the interests of today’s population to choose policies that
shift some portion of the tax burden to the future, even if that population is altruistically linked
to future generations. The model I build to demonstrate and measure this bias in favour of
deficits is a simple optimal growth model with overlapping dynasties, factor taxation and public
debt, calibrated for the US economy.
In 1946, a year after the end of World War II, gross US federal debt reached 119.0% of GDP.
For thirty-five years, the debt burden declined steadily, reaching only 31.0% in 1981. Since then,
during the three decades that followed, the debt has more than tripled and has exceeded 100%
since 2012. Publicly held, or net, debt has risen nearly as fast; from 24.6% of annual GDP in
1981, it reached 72.3% at the end of 2013.1 All indications suggest the debt burden, by either
measure, will continue to grow for the foreseeable future.
Each year, the US Congressional Budget Office produces two different estimates of future
spending, revenue, and the predicted trajectory of US Federal Government publicly held debt
for the decades to come. The first is the Extended Baseline Forecast, which is premised on four
main assumptions: that the Federal Government will contain entitlement spending, particularly
spending on Medicare; that growth in non-entitlement spending will no longer keep pace with
the growth in the economy as it has in the past; that temporary tax cuts which are set to expire
will no longer be renewed even if they have been renewed more than once in the past; and that
future tax brackets will be automatically indexed to inflation, as they have been since 1985,
but not adjusted to reflect real income growth in the economy. Though the population is aging
and the bill for Medicare is driving total expenditure higher, the Extended Baseline Forecast
for 2014 shows revenue growing as well (Figure 1), particularly because of its assumption of
limited indexing. Meanwhile, Figure 2 shows publicly held debt as forecast in 2014 increasing
but at a slower pace, reaching 100% of GDP by 2036, and 225% by 2089.
Along with the Extended Baseline Forecast, the CBO produces an Alternative Fiscal Sce-
1Publicly held debt includes Federal Government debt held by foreign and international investors, domestic
publicly held debt, outside the Federal Reserve, federal debt held by Federal Reserve. Gross debt includes
intergovernmental holding of debt as well, particularly in the Social Security Trust Fund, reflecting a portion of
the unfunded liabilities of the Federal government.
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nario. Here the CBO assumes Medicare costs will rise much as they have in the past; that those
temporary tax cuts which are typically renewed as a matter of course will again not be allowed
to expire; and that Federal spending other than Medicare and Social Security will continue
to grow at the same rate as the economy. Most important, it assumes that as incomes rise
faster than prices, Congress will prevent so-called ‘real bracket creep’ from turning increasing
numbers of people into high marginal rate tax payers. In this scenario, public debt grows along
an explosive path. In 2009 the Alternative Fiscal Scenario had the debt burden reaching 223%
of GDP by 2040, and 767% of GDP by 2083. The 2010 estimate predicted the debt reaching
233% by 2040 and 947% by 2084. In 2011, the CBO predicted the debt to GDP ratio would
reach 195% by 2036, but declined to extrapolate any further, arguing in effect that the econ-
omy simply could not sustain a debt burden any higher. By 2014 the predicted accumulation
of debt in the Alternative Fiscal Scenario had slowed slightly, exceeding 200% in 2045 and as
debt service spirals higher, 250%—after 2050—the CBO’s new threshold of unsustainability.
One way to distinguish between the two sets of predictions is that under the Extended
Baseline Forecast, while tax revenue so far has proven inadequate to preclude the rise in debt
over the previous thirty years, tax rates will rise in the near future in part to pay for entitlements
and also to finance interest payments on the higher level of debt. Under the Alternative Fiscal
Scenario, the rise in tax rates is postponed indefinitely. Yet unless the US defaults or repudiates
its debt, or economic growth rates are far higher than anticipated, in this scenario too, if the
debt burden is ever to stabilize, taxes will eventually rise, and possibly by a great deal more.
In either case, this pattern of maintaining relatively low rates of taxation over long periods of
time, even as the liabilities that will necessitate far higher future taxes to finance them continue
to mount, is a puzzle. It contradicts some basic prescriptions of optimal fiscal policy: keep tax
rates predictable and, in the case of distortionary taxes, smooth them over time to minimize
the overall excess burden they generate.
There is a wide-ranging literature exploring the many reasons why governments, even ab-
stracting from distributional issues, might not adopt first or even second-best fiscal policies.
If agents are indifferent to the next generation’s welfare, they will of course support policies
that shift the burden of funding government expenditure to the future. Even if agents are not
indifferent to their children’s welfare, but some are bequest-constrained, as in Cukierman and
Meltzer (1989), a constituency in favour of deficit finance can emerge. Rogoff (1990) proposed
that in a society with asymmetric information, politicians have an incentive to spend more
and tax less prior to an election. Voters, according to Rogoff, are not irrational, but lack the
opportunity either to directly observe the competence of their leaders, or to judge the appropri-
ateness of the policies they pursue. Similarly, Lizzeri (1999) and Battagliani and Coate (2008)
demonstrate that voters or legislators may support benefits for themselves while treating the
future tax burden as a commons. Finally, politicians may choose to increase the debt burden
while in power as a device to control or tie the hands of possible successor governments, as in
Persson and Svensson (1989) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990).
Yet government budgets are not always in deficit, and even when they are, in years when
economic growth is sufficiently high the debt burden still declines. The US and most other
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advanced nations emerged from World War II with extraordinarily high debt burdens that
they immediately set about paying down through a combination of primary surpluses, real
growth, and liquidation though a mixture of high inflation and financial repression (Reinhart
and Sbrancia, 2011). Why did governments choose to pay down debts until sometime between
the mid-1970’s and the early 1980’s? As early as 1977, Buchanan and Wagner argued that
the widespread adoption of Keynesian analysis provided intellectual cover for policy makers
to indulge their inclination to spend but not to tax.2 An alternative explanation, popular
with political commentators and journalists, combines intergenerational conflict and shifting
cultural norms. According to this ‘selfish generation’ hypothesis, today’s adults, particularly
members of the cohorts born during the post-war baby boom, are less willing to sacrifice for
the benefit of future generations, including their own children.3 My explanation does not rely
on intergenerational selfishness, but argues that voters tolerate higher deficit spending only
because they understand that their own children will not inherit the burden of it alone, but will
share it with future immigrants.
During the 1970’s, the rate of net migration to the United States averaged less than 1.9 per
thousand. It rose to an average of just under 2.8 during the 1980’s, and then to just over 4.3
during the 1990’s, before receding to just under 3.2 per thousand during the first decade of this
century. Net migration has been higher in the past, averaging 6.4 per thousand during the first
decade of the twentieth century.4 Yet the impact of immigration on the future composition of
the population is a function not only of the rate at which new immigrants arrive, but also of
the demographic characteristics of the society that absorbs them. Hence, the prevailing high
birth rates between 1870 and 1910 meant that though the United States experienced rates
of net migration that have never since been repeated, the share of the population that was
foreign-born actually shrank over those four decades, from 14.4% to 13.3%.5 A century later,
the foreign-born share of the population rose from 5.4% in 1970 to 13.1% in 2010, and it is
predicted to reach 19% by 2050. By then the US population is projected to grow from 304
million to 438 million, with nearly the entire increase comprised of future immigrants or their
descendants.6
Others before have drawn a possible connection between growing intergenerational imbal-
ances and immigration. To consider how much existing patterns of immigration might ame-
2In their view, Keynesians came to dominate economic policymaking soon after the end of World War II, their
growing influence culminating in passage of the tax cut of 1964. Nonetheless, in the years that followed the debt
burden continued to decline, albeit more slowly. Buchanan and Wagner, 1977, pg 48.
3See David Brooks, The Geezers’ Crusade, The New York Times, February 2, 2010 Tuesday, pg 27; Ed Howker
and Shiv Malik, 2010, Jilted Generation, Icon Books, London; Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Scott Burns, 2004, The
Coming Generational Storm, MIT Press, Cambridge MA; David Willetts, 2010, The Pinch, Atlantic Books,
London.
4Calculations based on Campbell Gibson, 1975, “The Contribution of Immigration to United States Population
Growth: 1790- 1970” International Migration Review 9(2):157-177 and United States Bureau of the Census, 1975,
Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Washington, D.C.
5Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew
Sobek. 2012. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
6Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “U.S. Population Projections: 2005–2050,” Pew Research Center, Social
and Demographic Reports, 2008, p. 2.
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liorate the fiscal imbalances in the United States, Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999) consider
how much a suspension of all future immigration might exacerbate them. Using a generational
accounting framework, their findings suggest only a limited role for immigration. By contrast
Bonin et al. (2000) find that if the present pattern of immigration to Germany is maintained,
the arrival of immigrants does partly reduce, though certainly does not eliminate, fiscal imbal-
ances borne by future generations of natives. Fehr et al. (2004) find that doubling immigration
rates will only slightly mitigate future tax rises in the European Union, Japan, and the US.
Storesletten (2000) found that high-skilled professional workers entering the United States in
their early 40’s generate such high tax revenue that their arrival alone could rebalance fiscal
policy at the time—provided that the number of immigrants rose by 40%, and more crucially,
that all of them fit this very narrow profile. Other types of immigrants are not nearly as helpful
to public finances, and low-skilled immigrants generate net losses. Storesletten (2004) finds
that with its more generous welfare payments, relatively high unemployment, and the low labor
force participation rates that prevail for its immigrants, immigration to Sweden generates a net
loss.
The best feature of these last papers is the well-articulated age structures of the populations
being modeled, something that the overlapping generations structure on which they are based
easily accommodates. At the same time these overlapping generations models exclude intergen-
erational altruistic links. In essence everyone in these models begins life as an immigrant—the
new born offspring of a native and newly arrived adult immigrants differ only in the shape and
length of their earnings profile. Otherwise, long-run fiscal imbalances affect each of these groups
in similar ways. By adopting an overlapping dynasties approach, I assume that if members of
one generation already resident in the country benefit from unfunded tax cuts, they can use
bequests to share their gain with their descendents, and also compensate them for both the
higher tax burden and any additional dead weight losses that financing the additional debt
might entail.
In Section 2, I present the overlapping dynasties model, which features a continuous inflow
of infinite-lived optimizing agents.7 Government consumption, transfers, and debt service are
financed by taxation on both capital and labor, as well as new bond issuance. In Section 3, I
calibrate the model to match some of the main features of the US economy. While immigration
may create a bias in favour of deficit finance, the crucial element in determining both the scope
and scale of any benefit natives and other long standing residents derive from such policies is
the trajectory of taxes during both the periods when the debt is still accumulating and after
it is ultimately stabilised. In Section 4, I start my analysis by first considering the simplest
case, in which government consumption as a share of output remains constant, similar to the
experience of the United States during the last half century, but transfer payments increase, as
they are expected to for the next several decades while public debt accumulates. The debt is
ultimately stabilised when the tax on labour earnings is raised to not only pay for the continuing
flow of government expenditure but also to service the higher stock of debt. In a deterministic
economy, and in the absence of immigration, the intertemporal shifts in either the tax rate on
7The original version of the overlapping dynasties model was developed by Weil (1989).
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wages or transfer payments is welfare neutral—i.e., Ricardian equivalence prevails.
Immigration alters these calculations. The anticipation that new people will join the econ-
omy in the future, and assume responsibility for financing a share of however much debt the
government has accumulated in the interim, creates an incentive on the part of the initial popu-
lation to postpone taxes for as long as possible. Indeed, this effect is expressed through the way
higher public debt raises the rate of return on the economy’s asset returns. Ben-Gad (2004)
demonstrates how the continuous flow of immigrants raises the rate of return for native-owned
capital and generates an immigration surplus. Here higher levels of debt amplify this effect.
In Section 5 I consider the behaviour of the model when it is the tax rate on capital that
is first lowered and then raised to new, higher, levels. First, any deviations from a policy that
smooths a distortionary tax implies an overall increase in its associated excess burden. Second,
because the supply of capital is inelastic in the short run but infinitely elastic in the long run,
the opposite policy of immediate increases in tax rates can be welfare-improving, provided the
surpluses are used to reduce public debt and facilitate lower rates of taxation in the future. The
impact of immigration flows, even at very low levels, can easily overwhelm both these effects.
The native population, though it pays a disproportionate share of the taxes levied on asset
income—immigrants may arrive with few assets but still have an incentive to save and invest,
particularly during the interim when the rate of return net of taxes is particularly elevated—can
still benefit from deficit finance even if it implies higher rates of tax in the future.
There are, however, two profound differences between shifting taxes on labour over time and
taxes on capital. Here, because of the endogeneity of capital, there is a maximum amount of
debt the economy can sustain if only increases in the tax on assets are used to balance budgets
in the long term. Furthermore, for a given rate of immigration and time horizon before fiscal
consolidation is enacted, the optimal policy of initial tax cuts and subsequant debt accumulation
usually falls short of this theoretical maximum. Instead, policy makers focused on serving the
interests of the people already resident in the country choose policies that balance the desired
shift in the tax burden towards future immigrants, against the efficiency losses generated by
deviating from a policy of tax smoothing or of exploiting the lump-sum nature of short-term
capital taxation. This trade-off also means that the scope for improving native welfare through
this channel is more limited, though the optimal level of debt implied here is still very high.
In Section 6 I consider the behaviour of the model when deficit finance is accompanied by
a shift in the the tax burden between the two factors of production. First, cuts in the tax on
labour or higher transfer payments generate prolonged deficits, but the government ultimately
relies on higher taxes on asset income to achieve budget balance. I also consider the opposite—
lower capital taxation is balanced by eventually higher taxes on wages. As one might expect, the
latter case generates particularly high welfare gains for natives when more of the tax burden
is shifted to new immigrants whose income relies more heavily on wages.8 Natives enjoy a
secondary efficiency gain of permanently reducing highly distortionary taxation. Yet even in
8In the overlapping dynasty model presented below, the population absorbing new immigrants are themselves
members of families that have accumulated through past immigration starting in the infinite past. I use the term
natives as shorthand to refer to all previous cohorts of immigrants and their descendants as distinct from new
arrivals.
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Figure 1: US federal budgets from 1970 to 2013 with forecasts using extended baseline and
alternative fiscal scenarios generated by the Congressional Budget Office for 2014 to 2089.
the former case, provided immigration is sufficiently high, the shift from labour taxation to
capital taxation generates small welfare gains for natives as long as policy makers allow debt
to accumulate in the interim.
I make no effort to model the migration decision itself. For the United States as well as
Western Europe and the rest of the developed world, the marginal supply of potential immi-
grants from impoverished foreign countries is very large. Furthermore, even the prospect of
inheriting a portion of the growing national debt is unlikely to deter many people from the
world’s poorest countries from seeking a better life through migration.
2 The Basic Model
Consider an economy that is closed in every way but one: new people—adult immigrants—are
arriving from abroad at a continuous rate ofm (t) . These new immigrants are founding members
of new infinite-lived dynasties, each indexed by s ∈ R, the date at which the dynasties’ founding
members crossed the international frontier to instantaneously join the economy as workers,
consumers, and savers. The economic environment is assumed to be deterministic, and the
behavior of each agent, including each new immigrant and all of his or her descendants, can
be characterized as the maximization of a dynasty’s infinite horizon discounted utility function
7
Figure 2: US federal debt held by the public from 1970 to 2013 with forecasts using extended
baseline and alternative fiscal scenarios generated by the Congressional Budget Office for 2014
to 2089.
beginning at time s:
max
c,h
∫
∞
s
e(ρ−n)(s−t) ln c (s, t) dt, (1)
subject to a time t budget constraint:
·
a(s, t) = (1− τh (t))w(t)ϕ (s, t) + ((1− τk (t)) r(t)− n) a(s, t)− c(s, t) + q(s, t) ∀s, t ≥ s, (2)
and the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
e−
∫ t
s
((1−τk(v))r(v)−n)dva(s, t) = 0 ∀s, t ≥ s, (3)
where ρ is the subjective discount rate, n is the rate of natural population growth (the rate at
which each dynasty itself is growing), c(s, t), q(s, t) and a (s, t) are consumption, income received
from government transfer payments, and holdings of assets for the members of dynasties of
vintage s at time t ≥ s, and r(t) is the rate of return on assets at time t.9 The assets a (s, t) for
each household are the sum of holdings of physical capital k(s, t) and government debt b(s, t),
and the returns on these assets are taxed at the rate of τk (t). Labour supply is inelastically
supplied and normalised to one. It earns an economy-wide wage rate of w(t) multiplied by
9As in Ben-Gad (2004) and (2008), I assume complete intergenerational altruism, but otherwise this is most
similar to Canova and Ravn’s (2000) framework for analyzing the impact of German reunification. By contrast,
in Zak et al. (2002) agents live only two periods, and in Storesletten (2000) agents enjoy long but finite lives.
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ϕ (s, t) which represents the time t productivity of workers who are members of vintage s
households. These earnings are taxed at the rate τh (t). Taxes as well as the proceeds from
the sale of government debt, net of the payment of interest and principal, finance both the
transfer payments and government consumption—the latter I assume to be a share g(t) of
domestic output, net of capital depreciation. The solution to the optimization problem yields
the evolution of consumption for each individual dynasty s over time:
c (s, t) = c (s, s) eρ(s−t)e
∫ t
s
(1−τk(v))r(v)dv. (4)
I assume that productivity is the product of two components, an economy wide trend growing
at rate x, and a static term associated with the members of each dynasty of vintage s, so that
ϕ (s, t) = ξ (s) ext. The economy-wide feasibility and government’s budget constraints are
K˙(t) = (1− g(t))
(
F
(
K(t), extΞ(t)
)
− δK(t)
)
− δK(t)− C(t) + P (t)m (t) k(t, t), (5)
B˙(t) = g(t)
(
F
(
K(t), extΞ(t)
)
− δK(t)
)
+Q(t)− τh(t)w(t)e
xtΞ(t)
−τk(t)r(t) [K (t) +B (t)] + r(t)B(t) + P (t)m (t) b(t, t), (6)
where C(t) = ent
∫ t
−∞
e
∫ s
0 m(v)dvm (s) c(s, t)ds represents aggregate consumption, B(t) =
ent
∫ t
−∞
e
∫ s
0 m(v)dvm (s) b(s, t)ds publicly held government debt, Q(t) = ent
∫ t
−∞
e
∫ s
0 m(v)dvm (s) q(s, t)ds
aggregate transfer payments, Ξ(t) = ent
∫ t
−∞
e
∫ s
0 m(v)dvm (s) ξ(s)ds a weighted aggregation of
productivity across the different dynasties and P (t) = ent
∫ t
−∞
e
∫ s
0 m(v)dvm (s) ds the size of the
population. The function F : R2++ → R++ is homogeneous of degree one, and describes how
the inputs, aggregate capital K (t) = ent
∫ t
−∞
e
∫ s
0 m(v)dvm (s) k(s, t)ds, which depreciates at the
rate δ, and aggregate effective labor extΞ(t), produce a single good that is either consumed by
households or the government or invested in the production of more capital. The terms b(t, t)
and k(t, t) represent any assets, in the form of either bonds or capital, that new immigrants
arriving at time t may import with them.
Assume transfer payments evolve over time according to q(s, t) = ϱ (t) ξ (s) ext (transfer pay-
ments directly relate to the amount paid in contributions through the tax on labour earnings).
Then, integrating the first order conditions of the individual maximization problem and the
time t budget constraint over time, the consumption rule for dynasty s at time t is:
c (s, t) =
ρ− n
1 + θ
(ξ (s)ω(t) + a(s, t) ) ∀s, t ≥ s, (7)
where ω(t) =
∫
∞
t
exu−
∫ u
t
((1−τk(v))r(v)−n)dv [(1− τh (u))w(u) + ϱ (u)]w(u)du is the component of
households’ present discounted value of net labor and transfer income from time t forward
shared across the economy.
Aggregating (7) over all dynasties that have arrived by time t, differentiating with respect
to t, and substituting (5) and (6), aggregate consumption evolves according to:
C˙ (t) = [(1− τk (t)) r(t)− ρ+ n]C (t) + m (t)P (t)
C (t)
Ξ(t)
ξ (t)
+
ρ− n
1 + θ
P (t)m (t)
[
b(t, t) + k(t, t)−
B (t)
Ξ(t)
ξ (t)−
K (t)
Ξ(t)
ξ (t)
]
. (8)
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Rewriting (8), (5) and (6) in terms of stationary per-capita variables:
·
c˜ (t) = [(1− τk (t)) r(t)− ρ− x] c˜ (t)− (ρ− n)m (t)
P (t) ξ (t)
Ξ (t)
(
β (t) b˜ (t) + κ (t) k˜ (t)
)
, (9)
·
k˜ (t) = (1− g(t))
[
F
(
k˜(t), 1
)
− δ
]
− (n+ x) k˜(t)− c˜(t)−m (t)
P (t) ξ (t)
Ξ (t)
κ(t)k˜(t), (10)
·
b˜ (t) = g(t)
[
F
(
k˜(t), 1
)
− δk˜(t)
]
+ q˜ (t)− τh(t)w(t)− τk(t)r(t)k˜ (t) (11)
+ ((1− τk(t)) r(t)− n− x) b˜(t)−m (t)
P (t) ξ (t)
Ξ (t)
β (t) b˜ (t) ,
where c˜ (t)= C(t)
extΞ(t) , k˜ (t)=
K(t)
extΞ(t) , b˜ (t)=
B(t)
extΞ(t) , q˜ (t)=
Q(t)
extΞ(t) , κ(t) =
k(t)−k(t,t)
k(t) is the fractional
difference between per-capita physical capital and the physical capital owned by new immigrants
at the moment of their arrival, and β(t) = b(t)−b(t,t)
b(t) the analogous terms for government debt.
Both input factors receive their marginal products:
r(t) = Fk
(
k˜(t), 1
)
− δ, (12)
w(t) = Fψ
(
k˜(t), 1
)
. (13)
The present value of future government borrowing is limited by a transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
e−
∫ t
0 (1−τk(v))r(v)dvB(t), (14)
which implies that the time-discounted budget must remain balanced over the long run. In
terms of per-capita stationary variables this is:
b˜(0) =
∫
∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 (1−τk(v))r(v)dv
[
τh(t)w(t) + τk(t)r(t)k˜ (t)− g(t)
[
F
(
k˜(t), 1
)
− δk˜(t)
]]
dt. (15)
The system (9), (10) and (11), together with the government’s long-run budget constraint
(15), describes the behavior of the economy, where the products of m (t) with P (t)ξ(t)Ξ(t) and both
κ (t) and β (t) regulate the impact of immigration on the economy. If β (t)=0 and κ (t)=0, new
immigrants are identical to members of the already resident population, and changes in the rate
of immigration have no effect on per-capita variables in this model.
Finally, the production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
F
(
K(t), extΞ(t)
)
= K(t)α
(
extΞ(t)
)1−α
.
3 Calibrating the Model
Nearly fifty years after its passage, the provisions of the Hart-Cellar Immigration Act of 1965
still form the basis of present US immigration policy. The act removed the country quotas
first enacted in the Immigration Restriction Act of 1921, and made the category of family
unification, first introduced in the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952, the main route
for permanent settlement in the United States. Though it followed passage of the Civil Rights
10
Act of 1964 and coincided with the largest expansion in the scope of the welfare state since the
Great Depression, particularly the creation of the Medicare and Medicaid programmes, at the
time Hart-Cellar was not perceived as a major shift in overall US policy. Instead the expectation
was that rather than changing the magnitude of immigration flows, its main effect would be to
remove the preference for immigrants from the countries of Northwestern Europe, and thereby
enable the large numbers of Americans with roots in Southern and Eastern Europe, particularly
Greece, Italy, and Poland, to sponsor the immigration of the close family members they had left
behind as well as other relatives.10 Indeed, if during the fourteen years from 1952 through 1965
the annual rate of net migration to the United States averaged 1.81 per thousand, during the
subsequent fourteen-year period from 1966 through 1979 the average rate had increased only
to 1.95.
Beginning in 1980, the rate of immigration rose sharply, initially the result of a large increase
in the number of refugees and asylum seekers from Cuba and Indochina, and passage of the
Refugee Act that same year. Subsequent legislation, including the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, provided an amnesty to three million undocumented aliens already in the
country, and the Immigration Act of 1990 had the effect of increasing legal immigration by
thirty-five percent. From 1992 the US also began granting 65,000 H1-B visas to workers with
special skills, particularly in the fields of science and technology, and from 2001 through 2003
the programme was expanded to 195,000 per annum.11 The rate of net migration rose to an
average of 2.76 per thousand during the 1980’s and 4.43 per thousand during the 1990’s.
Yet it is important to emphasise that it is not the rising rate of immigration alone, but
rather its juxtaposition against a declining rate of natural population growth, as seen in Figure
3, that generated or reinforced a bias in favour of deficit finance. From its post-war maximum of
just over 16.4 per thousand in 1947, the rate of natural increase had dropped to just under 5.5
by 1973, and it is projected to continue to decline till the middle of the century. Immigration
is already the direct source of nearly forty percent of US population growth, and it will exceed
fifty percent sometime between 2027 and 2038. As in Figure 4, aside from the two year period
during 2006 and 2007, since 1972 the total fertility rate in the United States has fallen below
the replacement rate of 2.11 per thousand, and the projections prepared by the US Census
suggest it will continue to drop. Indeed, only the population momentum generated by the large
cohorts born during the quarter century that followed World War II ensures that despite below-
replacement fertility, the birth rate still exceeds the death rate. Furthermore, the predictions for
relatively high rates of natural population growth coincide with the high and median projections
regarding immigration flows, and reflect the relatively high fertility rates among immigrants.
This means these numbers understate the full contribution new immigrants make to long-
run population growth and the future composition of the population, as they abstract from
differences in total fertility rates between natives and immigrants. For example, new immigrants
who arrived between 1980 and 2005 and their US-born descendants account for 58% of the 68
million additional people added to the United States population during that period, equivalent
10Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay Winter, 1998, A Question of Numbers, Hill and Wang, New York, pg 140.
11Though these visas are only granted for three years, they are renewable and visa-holders are permitted to
simultaneously apply for permanent residence without prejudicing their status.
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Figure 3: Annual rates of population change per thousand from 1947 to 2013 and Projections
of the Population and Components of Change for the United States: 2015 to 2060. US Census
Low Migration Projection (NP2012-T1L) in red, Medium Migration Projection (NP2012-T1) in
green, and High Migration Projection (NP2012-T1H) in Blue. Sources: OECD and US Census
2012 National Projections.
to an annual rate of immigration of 6.0 per thousand.12 If, as predicted, this trend accelerates
so that the equivalent share from 2005-2050 is 82%, the equivalent rate of net migration will
amount to 8.4 per thousand, assuming the overall rate of population growth remains the same.13
When determining what fiscal policy is most advantageous for the population already resident
in the country, it is important to remember that because immigrants are generally younger
than the population that absorbs them, and in the United States their rates of total fertility are
higher as well, the effective rate of immigration, in terms of their impact on the future size and
composition of the population, is much larger than the published annual rates of net migration
would imply.
I follow the procedure in Mendoza et al. (1994), Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Gomme
and Rupert (2007) to calculate the tax rates on labour earnings (total compensation) and on the
return to capital (which includes the implicit return on the stock of consumer durables), except
that in Figure 5 the tax is imposed on returns net of depreciation. Given the tax rates, initial
ratios of consumption, public debt and capital to output, as well as government consumption
to net output g, the capital share in output α, the rate of natural population growth and the
12Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, 2008, p. 2.
13Ibid.
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Figure 4: Total rate of fertility in the United States from 1947 to 2013 and US Census Projec-
tions for 2012 to 2060. Sources: OECD and US Census 2012 National Projections.
different rates of immigration chosen for the simulation, I solve (9), (10) and (11) in steady
state to obtain the parameter values δ and ρ as well as the initial level of transfers.
My hypothesis is that as the source of population growth has shifted from one driven by
the excess of births to deaths in the native population to one increasingly reliant on higher
rates of immigration, and subsequent above-average birth rates among those newly arrived, a
bias in favour of deficit funding on the part of the native population emerges. Such a change is
inevitably driven by subtle shifts in attitudes and a consequent process of gradual adjustment
I find it convenient to choose a specific date as a starting point for this policy in my analysis.
It took time before the changes in immigration policy signified by passage of Hart-Cellar in
1965 became apparent. Similarly, the passage of legislation that year which expanded the scope
of welfare spending generated, along with changing demographics, a gradual rise in transfer
payments over decades rather than one sharp increase. Indeed, the debt-to-GDP ratio continued
its postwar decline before stabilising during the late 1970’s. Furthermore, although the growing
gap between expenditures on transfer payments and tax receipts on labour earnings is what
largely drives projections of future exponential growth in the debt burden, until very recently,
both rose in tandem. Instead, from the early 1980’s onward, it is the tax rate on capital, which
declines sharply in Figure 5, that generated most of the increase in debt in Figure 2. Therefore,
to calibrate the parameters of the model, including the overall rate of population growth, I use
long-run averages for the years between 1966 and 2012, but to set the initial value of the tax
rate on capital income, I average over the period between 1966 to 1980. As the aim of this work
13
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Figure 5: The average rates of tax on income from capital and income from labour earnings in
the United States, 1970-2012 are imputed using National Accounts data following the procedure
outlined in Gomme and Rupert (2007). Government expenditure (Federal, State and Local), is
a share of output, where output includes imputed services from consumer durables.
is to explain both the rise in United States public debt over recent decades, and its projected
increase in the decades to come, I solve for steady state values that are consistent with the ratio
of public debt to output during 1981, rather than taking an average across the entire period.
Labour supply in the model is inelastic, so the value of transfers, net of tax receipts from labour
earnings, serves as a residual, and is set to ensure that for the different rates of immigration,
the government’s budget is initially balanced.
Following the example of Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Gomme and Rupert (2007), hence-
forth output Y includes both gross domestic product and the imputed services from consumer
durables. Between 1966 and 2012 this measure of output was on average 8.07% higher than
GDP alone. During this same period, the capital-output ratio K/Y averaged 3.061, consump-
tion as a share of output C/Y averaged 0.586, and the rate at which real per-capita output
grew, x, averaged 0.019 per annum. The share of government consumption and investment
g out of net output (including services from consumer durables but excluding depreciation of
fixed assets) averaged 0.220. The share of capital income in output, including net interest pay-
ments, profits, and rental income, as well as the identical share of proprietors’ income together
averaged 0.376. I use that for the value of α. In 1981, the stock of US public debt corresponded
to 24.6% of GDP, which implies a debt-to-output ratio of 0.227, in terms of our more broadly
defined output. Between 1966 and 1981 the imputed tax rates on income from capital in Figure
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Figure 6: Difference in imputed wage rates for new immigrants (five years or less in the United
States) in the work force and all other workers aged 16 to 64, controlling for age. Data from 5%
public use micro samples for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000, and survey data from the American
Community Survey for each of the years from 2001 to 2012. Data Source: Steven Ruggles, J.
Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek.
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota, 2010.
5 averaged 0.320, and the average imputed tax rate on labour income between 1966 and 2012
was 0.242.
As natural population growth declined and immigration rose, the overall growth rate de-
clined gradually, varying between 7.3 and 14.0 per thousand and averaging 10.3. In my analysis,
I fix the overall rate of population growth at this average rate throughout, and vary the share
of that growth generated by immigration. I assume κ=1 and β=1—immigrants arrive in the
United States after having exhausted during their passage whatever capital they might have
owned, and do not arrive owning US government debt.
Finally, I assume the term ξ(t) which captures the productivity of new immigrants of vintage
t relative to the veteran population, evolves according to ξ(t) = e−
∫ t
0 γ(v)dv. If both the rate of
immigrationm (t) and the parameter γ (v) are constant, the difference between the productivity
of newly arrived immigrants and the average productivity of the entire stock of workers that
had previously joined the economy is equal to γ/ (γ −m). To determine this value, I use the
5% public use micro samples for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000, and survey data from the
American Community Survey for each of the years from 2001 to 2012, to estimate simple wage
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equations in semi-logarithmic form for people between the ages of 16 and 64 who report being
in the labour force. The wage rate is approximated by reported annual income from wages
divided by the usual number of hours worked in a week. Controlling for age, and interpolating
the results for the years between 1980 and 1990 and then from 1990 to 2000 in Figure 6, the
imputed wage rate for newly arrived immigrants (five years or less in the United States) is on
average 23.4% below that of all other workers. Rather than fixing the value of γ to one value,
in each simulation, as the rate of net migration is varied, γ is set to match this finding. To
better understand the role this factor plays in my results, I also simulate the model when the
value of the productivity differential γ/ (γ −m) is set equal to zero.
4 Intertemporal Shifts in Labour Taxation and Transfers
I start with labour taxation and transfers because intertemporal shifts in either are the simplest
to interpret. This is because transfer payments and tax revenue collected on labour earnings
enter the model directly only through (11), and only affect the behaviour of the economy through
the changes generated by the difference between them in the size of the public debt. In fact,
only when the economy is absorbing new immigrants does the rate of tax on labour earnings,
transfers or the size of the debt in (9) affect consumption, investment or the rate of return to
capital.
Government spending on transfer payments has risen steadily for decades, from 5.63% of
total output in 1966 to 16.7% in 2012. Yet as Figure 5 demonstrates, only in recent years has the
tax revenue collected on labour earnings failed to keep pace. Nonetheless, as the average age of
the population continues to rise, it is the expectation that the gap between the two will continue
to widen that drives projected future increases in debt in Figure 2. In all likelihood, any policy
of fiscal consolidation designed to eventually stabilise the burden of debt will involve increases
in the tax rate on wage income (through higher FICA contributions to stabilise the Social
Security Trust Fund) rather than cuts to the overall amount spent on transfer programmes, so
my analysis focuses on this scenario. However, it is important to emphasise that here, unlike
in the sections that follow, this distinction is not overly important. Instead it is the difference
between what the government spends on transfer payments and the revenue it raises by taxing
labour income that determines the trajectory of debt and its subsequent impact on welfare.
In keeping with the time scales in Figures 1 and 2, I assume a very high degree of policy
stickiness—the period between the initial rise in transfers until the moment of fiscal consoli-
dations when taxes must rise to satisfy (15) lasts T = 40 years. This baseline case roughly
matches a rise in transfer spending, net of labour tax receipts, that commence at the beginning
of this decade, with debt accruing faster than the growth rate of the economy till mid-century
in 2050, when according to the Alternative Fiscal Scenario published by the CBO the debt will
exceed what it deems to be the unsustainable level corresponding to 250% of output. I also
consider larger values of T = 55 and T = 70, to enable ready comparisons with the policy of
shifting the tax rate on capital income in Section 5—a policy that began in the early 1980’s
and was responsible for most of the increase in the debt so far.
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To offer but one example, suppose spending on transfers in (11) permanently increases by
the equivalent of one and a half percent of initial output. The payments accrue to the population
already resident at the moment the policy changes, but in subsequent years, as new immigrants
arrive, they too receive these payments, which increase at a fixed rate to keep pace with the
growing population and the economy’s exogenous long-run growth rate. The more time elapses
before the tax on wages is raised to stabilise the debt, the more debt accumulates and the
larger the corresponding tax increase necessary to exactly satisfy the transversality condition
(3) and the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (15). That means that after the
fiscal consolidation in period T , the new long-run tax rate on wages is adjusted permanently
to continue funding the higher transfer payments as well as the fixed share of government
expenditure in net output, and to service both the stock of pre-existing public debt and any
additional public debt that has accumulated in the interim. I set the difference in relative
productivity between the general population and newly arrived immigrants to γ/ (γ −m)=-
0.234 as implied by Figure 6, but for the purposes of comparison I also consider the case where
there is no productivity differential and γ/ (γ −m)=0, and consider rates of immigrationm that
range between zero and ten per thousand, implying in the latter case that nearly all population
growth is generated by net migration.
For each value of T and rate of immigration m, the third column in Table 1 lists the changes
to the debt burden by period T .14 After T = 40 years, the additional accumulated debt is
equivalent to 102.0% of output if the rate of immigration is zero, but climbs in small increments
as the rate of immigration is increased to 104.0% if the rate of immigration is ten per thousand.
The fourth column captures the small changes to the long-run debt burden, if any, that occur
after T as the capital stock and output converge. The differences here are even smaller, varying
between the same 102.0% of output if immigration is zero and 103.5% when it is ten. The
stabilisation of the debt burden is accomplished by raising the rate of tax on labour from its
initial value of 0.242 from T onwards, and the new tax rates that accompany fiscal consolidation
are listed in the fifth column and range from 0.306 to 0.308. If we raise the value of T to 55
years, so that the increase in transfer payments either commences fifteen years earlier or fiscal
consolidation is postponed by an additional fifteen years, the economy accumulates additional
long-run debt that range between 174.5% and 179.3% of output, and the corresponding labour
tax rates necessary to service it ranges between 0.335 and 0.340. Increase the value of T to
70 and the corresponding increments to the debt burden and long-run tax rates range between
279.2% and 292.3%, and 0.376 and 0.388, respectively.
A country that receives no new immigrants is very different from one absorbing them at the
rate of one percent per year. Yet those differences are hardly manifested in the behaviour of
additional accumulation of debt or new tax rates presented above. Certainly in this example,
it cannot be said that the flow of immigrants serves to dilute public debt. Furthermore, a
comparison of the upper and lower halves of Table 1 demonstrates that changing the value
of γ/ (γ −m) to zero so that all workers, including new immigrants, are equally productive
14To capture the non-linearities of transition paths, I assemble Pade´ approximants of order (2,1) using first,
second and third order perturbations.
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Figure 7: Increasing transfer payments by 1.5% of output and then raising tax rate on wage
earnings in T=40, 55 or 70 years. Impulse responses for net the rate of return, change in
basis points, for different annual rates of immigration per thousand of zero: red, two: green,
four: blue, six: black, eight: purple, ten: brown. Overall rate of population change is 10.3 per
thousand.
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does not alter this pattern. Yet though differences in rates of immigration barely alter the
path of debt or subsequant tax rates on labour earnings, it is the rate of immigration that
determines the impact upon the welfare of the population already resident in the country of a
policy to permanently increase transfer payments for all, while resorting to deficit finance over
a prolonged period to pay for them.
To demonstrate, I plot the impulse responses in Figure 7 for the rate of return on assets
following the increase in transfer spending. Note how in each example the magnitude of the
response directly relates to the rate of immigration. To see why, note that the last term in
(9), κ (t) k˜ (t) where κ (t) > 0, multiplied by the rate of immigration m (t) and corrected by the
term that governs the relative productivity of new immigrants P (t)ξ(t)Ξ(t) , captures the dynamic
form of the immigration surplus—a measure of how the supply of labour provided by immigrant
workers complements the stock of native-owned capital and raises its rate of return. For our
baseline case, where T = 40 and γ/ (γ −m) =- 0.234, each unit increment in the underlying
rate of immigration, from zero to ten per thousand, corresponds to between one and a half
and two basis points in the long-run response of the rate of return on assets that follows the
increase in spending of one and a half percent of output. These higher rates of return boost
the growth rate of each household’s consumption in (4). This effect might seem small, but it
is cumulative, and by reinforcing the immigration surplus it generates a large enough wealth
effect, that upon impact, consumption in the sixth (penultimate) column of Table 1 increases
despite the anticipated rise in interest rates.
This does not mean that the boost to the immigration surplus is a Pareto improving shift
towards dynamic efficiency. The rate of return to capital is always higher than the growth
rate of the economy. Instead, new immigrants pay higher taxes on the wages they receive to
service the debt accumulated before they arrived. As public debt gradually crowds out some
investment in physical capital, so pre-tax wages, upon which immigrants who arrive with few
assets disproportionately rely, also decline.
By maximising the welfare of those resident at time t=0, I mean maximising the intertem-
poral utility of the infinite-lived dynasties. It must be emphasized that this is not a mechanism
for intergenerational redistribution or conflict. Policy makers are implicitly concerned not only
with the welfare of today’s population but with the welfare of all of its descendants. The only
people whose interests I assume are ignored are those of the future immigrants yet to arrive in
the country at the time when the policy is determined, as well as their descendents.15
To measure the welfare implications of these policies I compare the discounted welfare gen-
erated by the evolution of c(0, t), the per-capita consumption of anyone already resident in the
country at time t=0, against the discounted welfare generated by the analogous counterfactual
15Even if the policy were re-evaluated in each period, and immigration were the sole source of all population
growth, it would take more than seventy years for the accumulated stock of new immigrants who arrive after t=0
to form a majority. Hence policies that serve the interests of the entire population when they are introduced,
though not strictly time consistent because of the presence of capital in the economy, do benefit the majority of
the population for far longer than the highest value of T in my simulations.
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consumption path c(0, t), were the initial policy of budget balance to remain in force:
∫
∞
0
e(n−ρ)t ln c (0, t) dt =
∫
∞
0
e(n−ρ)t ln
[(
1 +
pm,γ,T
100
)
c(0, t)
]
dt. (16)
The difference between the two, the welfare effect, is measured as a compensating differential—a
permanent percentage pm,γ,T of consumption sufficient to compensate native households for not
deviating from the baseline fiscal policy. Inserting (4) into (16) and solving for pm,γ,T yields:
pm,γ,T = 100×
(
c (0, 0)
c (0, 0)
e
(ρ−n)
∫
∞
0
∫ t
0 e
(n−ρ)t((1−τk(v))r(v))dvdt−
(1−τ¯k)r¯
ρ−n − 1
)
. (17)
The values of pm,γ,T that correspond to the policy of increased spending on transfers are
listed in the last column of Table 1, and it is here where the changes to the rate of return to
capital associated with different rates of immigration find their expression. For the baseline case
where the debt is stabilised after forty years, the benefit that accrues to the native population
is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 0.159% if the rate of immigration is
two per thousand. Double the rate of immigration to four per thousand and the benefit nearly
doubles as well to 0.412%. Figure 8 illustrates the near linear relationship between the rate of
immigration and the value of pm,γ,T associated with this particular policy. Increase the time
span between the rise in expenditures and the rise in the taxes to pay for them by fifteen or
thirty years, and the corresponding welfare benefit climbs to 0.216% and 0.417% or 0.273% and
0.522%. Eliminate the productivity gap between new immigrants and the general population in
the right hand panel of Figure 8, and the bottom half of Table 1 raises the value of pm,γ,T as well.
A rate of immigration of approximately four per thousand best matches the raw projections we
see in Figure 3, but this might not be the number most relevant in the context of the model. If
as explained in Section 3 we adjust the rate of migration to capture the higher fertility of new
immigrants, the appropriate share of future population growth from 1980 onwards is at least
6.0 and perhaps as high as 8.4, and the welfare benefits natives enjoy as a result of this policy
approach the equivalent of permanently raising consumption by one percent.
To achieve welfare gains significantly higher requires a far more aggressive degree of deficit
spending. This is certainly a theoretical possibility—the red, green, blue, black, purple and
brown curves, corresponding to annual rates of immigration of zero, two, four, six eight and
ten per thousand, in the six panels in Figure 9 illustrate that for a given value of T , rate of
migration m, and measure of relative productivity differential γ/ (γ −m), there is a nearly
linear relationship between changes to the long-run debt burden and the corresponding welfare
measure pm,γ,T . The red curves are horizontal lines, as shifting transfers and labour taxes across
time if the economy is not absorbing new immigrants is Ricardian neutral, but the slopes of the
remaining curves are positive and increasing in the rate of immigration. A permanent increase
in transfer payments that causes the debt burden to climb by 225% of output in the space
of seventy years, a trajectory that matches the predictions of the CBO’s Alternative Fiscal
Scenario, corresponds to a welfare gain equivalent to a 0.6% increase in consumption if the
effective rate of immigration is six per thousand, and 0.8% if the rate of immigration is eight.
Assume the debt reaches 500% instead (setting aside the practical limitations of sustaining a
debt of this magnitude), and the corresponding welfare measures are 1.2% and 1.6%. Note also
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New ∆ Debt ∆ Debt Labour Initial Welfare as
Immigrants as Percent as Percent Tax Change Percent of
Per of Output of Output Rate in Native Permanent
Thousand at T : Long-Run after T Consumption Consumption
100×∆ b(T )
y(T )
100×∆ b(∞)
y(∞)
τh(t > T ) 100×
(
c(0,0)
c(0,0)
− 1
)
pm,γ,T
Relative Productivity of New Immigrants, γ/ (γ −m) = -0.234
T = 40
0
2
4
6
8
10
102.0
102.3
102.7
103.1
103.6
104.0
102.0
102.2
102.5
102.8
103.2
103.5
0.306
0.306
0.307
0.307
0.308
0.308
0
0.010
0.020
0.031
0.044
0.056
0
0.159
0.309
0.451
0.587
0.716
T = 55
0
2
4
6
8
10
174.5
175.7
177.0
178.4
179.9
181.5
174.5
175.3
176.2
177.2
178.2
179.3
0.335
0.335
0.336
0.337
0.339
0.340
0
0.013
0.027
0.043
0.059
0.077
0
0.216
0.417
0.605
0.780
0.943
T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
279.2
282.6
286.3
290.3
294.7
299.4
279.2
281.5
283.9
286.5
289.3
292.3
0.376
0.378
0.380
0.383
0.385
0.388
0
0.013
0.027
0.043
0.059
0.077
0
0.273
0.522
0.751
0.961
1.155
Relative Productivity of New Immigrants, γ/ (γ −m) =0
T = 40
0
2
4
6
8
10
102.0
102.3
102.6
103.0
103.4
103.9
102.0
102.2
102.5
102.8
103.2
103.5
0.306
0.306
0.307
0.307
0.307
0.308
0
0.012
0.025
0.040
0.055
0.072
0
0.194
0.376
0.547
0.707
0.857
T = 55
0
2
4
6
8
10
174.5
175.6
176.9
178.3
179.9
181.6
174.5
175.2
175.9
176.8
177.8
178.8
0.335
0.335
0.336
0.337
0.339
0.340
0
0.012
0.026
0.040
0.056
0.073
0
0.264
0.506
0.728
0.933
1.121
T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
279.2
282.6
286.6
290.9
295.7
301.0
279.2
281.2
283.5
286.1
288.9
292.0
0.376
0.378
0.380
0.383
0.386
0.389
0
0.012
0.025
0.040
0.055
0.072
0
0.333
0.631
0.900
1.142
1.362
Table 1: Increasing transfer payments by 1.5% of output and then raising tax rate on wage
earnings in T=40, 55 or 70 years.
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Figure 8: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm,γ,T that correspond to
different rates of immigration after increasing transfer payments by 1.5% of output and then
raising tax rate on wage earnings in T=40, 55 or 70 years.
that native workers stand to benefit more if the recent improvement in the relative productivity
of immigrant workers as seen in Figure 6, continues. Were there no productivity gap between
new immigrants and native workers, the welfare measures associated with reaching 250% in
seventy years are 0.7% and 0.9%, again for rates of migration equivalent to six or eight per
thousand. Finally, the longer a given tax cut prevails, the more natives benefit, but the larger
the number of immigrant cohorts that arrive immediately after who also gain. This is why, as
Figure 9 illustrates, natives benefit most from steeper tax cuts over shorter time spans rather
than longer-lasting but more modest tax cuts. For a given long-run debt burden, the smaller
the value of T , the higher values of pm,γ,T .
What this means is that, if we assume immigrants’ overall contribution to population growth
implies an effective rate of immigration between 2011 and 2050 of about eight per thousand,
that tax rates do not rise so that the debt is permitted to climb to 250% of output during
these forty years (as predicted in the Alternative Fiscal Scenario in Figure 2), followed by a rise
in the tax rate on labour earnings, the corresponding benefit to the native population will be
equivalent to approximately a permanent 1.3% increase in consumption. And this is without
considering how much transfer spending is skewed in favour of older natives rather than younger
new immigrants. Were the debt to climb even faster the benefits could be larger still. We are left
with a puzzle—from the perspective of the native population, the scope for increasing transfer
payments and using deficit finance to enhance their own welfare is underutilised, or there are
other constraints on the accumulation of debt beyond the scope of the model.
5 Intertemporal Shifts in Capital Taxation
In an optimal growth model, the long-run supply of capital is infinitely elastic, so fluctua-
tions in the tax on income from capital have the greatest potential to increase excess burden.
Nonetheless, when the economy is absorbing new immigrants the gains that accrue to the native
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Figure 9: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm,γ,T and the long-term
debt burden generated by increasing transfer payments and then raising the tax rate on wage
earnings in T=40, 55 or 70 years. Impulse responses for net the rate of return, change in
basis points, for different annual rates of immigration per thousand of zero: red, two: green,
four: blue, six: black, eight: purple, ten: brown. Overall rate of population change is 10.3 per
thousand.
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population from shifting these taxes to the future will usually dominate the deadweight loss.
I calibrate the model by setting the tax rate on capital equal to 0.320, to match its average
between 1966 and 1980. In the early 1980’s this tax rate dropped quickly, and from 1981 till
2012, it averaged only 0.270. Were other taxes raised or spending reduced to compensate for
the lost revenue, the policy change could be interpreted as simply reducing the relatively high
excess burden associated with this tax. Instead, from 1981 onward (with a brief hiatus between
1994 and 2001) the debt burden has grown.
Consider the effect of lowering the tax rate on asset income from 0.32 to 0.27, starting in 1981
for T=40, 55 or 70 years. This is equivalent to assuming that a policy of fiscal consolidation to
stabilise the government budget will commence either at the end of this decade in 2020, fifteen
years later in 2035, or mid-century in 2050, when again, according to the Alternative Fiscal
Scenario published by the CBO, the debt will exceed what it deems to be the unsustainable
level corresponding to 250% of output.
Comparing the third and fourth columns in Tables 1 and 2, this policy generates changes in
the debt burden that are roughly comparable to those associated with an increase in transfer
spending of one and a half percent of output, particularly for higher values of T . However,
there is an important difference: Unlike the case of intertemporal shifts in transfers and wage
taxation, here the rate of return on capital is not only gradually and indirectly affected by
the accumulation of debt through (11), but immediately and directly through (9). Hence the
impulse responses in Figure 7 describing the behaviour of the net rate of return on assets bear
little resemblance to those in Figure 10. The after-tax rate of return rises by approximately
39 basis points on impact. From this moment it begins to decline, the effect of the lower tax
rate on savings and the accumulation of physical capital initially dominating any crowding
out from the growing burden of public debt, before reversing direction again and increasing as
the date T draws closer, and agents reduce investment in new capital in anticipation of the
higher taxes they will soon pay. Though difficult to discern given the scale of the shifts in the
impulse responses over time, comparing any two, the one that corresponds to a higher rate
of immigration dominates its counterpart at every point in time. Ultimately, in the very long
run, after all the fluctuations, if the rate of immigration is positive, higher debt translates into
permanently higher rates of return, even after accounting for the higher taxes paid on it (listed
in the sixth column of Table 2), but only after a period of transition that lasts for decades long
after T . In the initial response to this type of policy, in contrast to cuts in labour taxes, here
the substitution effect dominates any income effect—natives immediately lower consumption
by 0.3 to 0.33% to take advantage of the higher rates of return.
Using the formula (17) to compute welfare, in the absence of immigration, there would be
no justification visible in the last column of Table 2 for the policy adopted in the early 1980’s
of lowering the rate of taxation on asset income from 0.32 to 0.2, if in fact it is only to be raised
sometime in the future. As the debt burden increases by 94.6%, 169.1% or 289.7% of output
over the course of T=40, 55 or 70 years, the losses in welfare correspond to permanent drops of
-0.178%, -0.295% or -0.488% in permanent consumption. Indeed, this particulary policy only
generates positive values of pm,γ,T in Figure 11 if the annual rate of immigration is higher than
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two to three per thousand. The distortionary effect of allowing this tax to fluctuate so much
overwhelms the benefits of sharing the higher future tax burden with immigrants.
To illustrate this trade-off, I plot the values of pm,γ,T in Figure 12 that correspond to
different changes in the debt burden.16 Unlike shifting the tax burden on labour earnings in
Figure 9, here the relationship is no longer monotonic. Instead, for each length of time T , value
of relative productivity γ/ (γ −m) and positive rate of immigration m, the value of pm,γ,T
increases the larger the long-term debt burden, but only to a point, after which the values
decline and some eventually become negative. For the native population, temporary tax cuts
are generally beneficial but only to a point. Table 3 lists the long-term change in the debt
burden and welfare effects that correspond to the maximum compensating differentials p∗m,γ,T
for each curve in Figure 12 along with the change in debt at time T , the tax rates on capital
that prevail both between time zero and T and after T , and the initial change in consumption
chosen by natives on impact.
Once again the shapes of the red curves, this time in Figure 12, tells us what would be the
optimal policy if the economy were not absorbing any immigrants at all. The logic of Harberger’s
triangle nearly prevails—as in Lucas and Stokey (1983), in their model without capital, the
convexity of the excess burden with respect to the tax rate implies the best policy is to smooth
the tax rate over time, and not depart from steady state. However, there are two reasons why
slight deviations from tax smoothing will generate small welfare benefits here. First, the short-
run supply of capital is inelastic, so the lump-sum property of taxing it immediately at a higher
rate is beneficial, particularly if the additional revenue is applied to a partial redemption of
public debt, enabling lower taxes in the future.17 Second, the model is not calibrated around
the Ramsey second-best optimal policy—the tax rate on capital is higher than the share of
government expenditure in output.18 Raising the tax rate from period zero to T means that in
the long run the economy will converge closer to a steady state that is Ramsey-optimal. These
two reasons are why, in the absence of immigration, a policy that raises the tax on capital
income in the short run to redeem part of the debt generates a very small welfare benefit.
As in Section 4, here too the lower the value of T , the smaller the number of immigrants
who experience the period of lower taxation, which is why ceteris paribus, the quick accumu-
lation of extra debt through steep cuts in labour taxation dominates a more gradual policy of
longer duration. Here, however, there is a countervailing tax smoothing argument in favour of
accumulating debt more gradually, through smaller tax cuts of longer duration. That is why
for a given change in the long-run burden of debt, the value of pm,γ,T in Figure 12 is much less
16The endogeneity of capital supply means there is a Laffer curve that describes the amount of revenue the
government can raise through higher taxes on capital income, and this in turn implies an upper limit on the
amount of debt the government can accumulate through a policy that shifts this tax rate alone across time. This
means future tax rates can be set no higher than 0.79, a range sufficient to service maximum debts of between
574% (when immigration is ten per thousand and all workers are equally productive) and 622% of output. As
before, I will assume debt can reach nearly that high—500%.
17This is a direct implication of Theorem 3 in Chamley (1986).
18Because government expenditure in not a fixed amount but a fraction g of net output, the second-best long-
run optimal policy is not the familiar Chamley-Judd result of eliminating the tax on income from capital and
placing the burden of government finance on labor, but rather to set all taxes equal to g. See Ben-Gad (2014).
25
sensitive to different values of T than it is in Figure 9.
Note also that the vertical scale for the panels in Figure 9 is about three times higher than
in Figure 12, so overall there is far less scope for using deficit finance for the benefit of native
households when policy makers are constrained to shifting the tax rate on capital income rather
than labour across time. If the rate of immigration is only two per thousand, and the fiscal
gap is closed in T=40 years, then cutting the tax rate on capital income from 0.32 to 0.299
maximises the welfare of the native population. The debt burden increases by 37.4% of output
from its initial value 22.7% of output at T=40, and then gradually declines to 59.0% once the
economy has fully converged to its new balanced growth path. The welfare benefit generated
by this policy is small, equivalent to permanently increasing consumption by only 0.014%. If
the rate of immigration is double, four instead of two per thousand, the maximum welfare
benefit rises to 0.107%, which is attained by first lowering the tax rate to 0.267. If the rate
of immigration is doubled once more to eight per thousand, then the value of p∗m,γ,T climbs to
0.510%. Higher values of T mean the long-run debt rises more even though tax rates fluctuate
less, but the values of p∗m,γ,T do not change much unless we assume the productivity of new
immigrants matches that of the absorbing population in the lower half of Table 3.
Table 3 describes the hypothetical behaviour of policy makers using intertemporal shifts in
the burden of capital taxation over a fixed interval of time as a tool for improving the welfare
of the native population when the economy is absorbing immigrants at different rates. By
contrast, Table 2 provides a rough description of one element of recent US fiscal history, the
reduction in the tax rate on capital income from about 0.320 to 0.27 during the early 1980’s
and the accumulation of debt that followed. Is there any relationship between them? Yes,
particularly if we focus on the case where fiscal consolidation is postponed till T = 70. The
policy that maximises native welfare lowers the tax rate on capital to 0.276 if the effective rate
of immigration is equal to six per thousand and to 0.264 if immigration is eight per thousand.
In Figure 13, I plot the behaviour of the debt burden, measured in terms of GDP (rather than
output, which here includes services from consumption goods), that corresponds to each of the
maximising policies in Table 3 for the case where T=70 and γ/(γ−m)=-0.234, against both the
historical record and its predicted path according to the Alternative Fiscal Scenario produced
by the CBO. Note that the path corresponding to an immigration rate of six per thousand best
matches both, suggesting the model could provide at least some explanation for the persistence
of the US fiscal gap both in the past and perhaps in the future.
6 Shifting Taxes Between Labour and Capital
Of course there is no reason to assume that if at a given moment policy makers choose to lower
a particular tax, this is the tax that decades later will be adjusted to ultimately stabilise the
government’s finances. In this section, I briefly analyse the degree to which the qualitative and
quantitative results in Section 4 or 5 might be altered when the government switches between
the two tax instruments.
Just as in Figure 9, the panels in Figure 14 represent the relationship between changes in
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Figure 10: Temporarily lowering the tax rate on asset income for T=40, 55 or 70 years. Im-
pulse responses for net the rate of return, change in basis points, for different annual rates of
immigration per thousand of zero: red, two: green, four: blue, six: black, eight: purple, ten:
brown. Overall rate of population change is 10.3 per thousand.
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New ∆ Debt ∆ Debt Capital Initial Welfare as
Immigrants as Percent as Percent Tax Change Percent of
Per of Output of Output Rate in Native Permanent
Thousand at T : Long-Run after T Consumption Consumption
100×∆ b(T )
y(T )
100×∆ b(∞)
y(∞)
τk(t > T ) 100×
(
c(0,0)
c(0,0)
− 1
)
pm,γ,T
Relative Productivity of New Immigrants, γ/ (γ −m) = − 0.234
T = 40
0
2
4
6
8
10
94.6
94.3
94.0
93.8
93.6
93.3
89.0
88.7
88.5
88.2
88.0
87.8
0.405
0.406
0.406
0.407
0.407
0.408
−0.032
−0.032
−0.031
−0.031
−0.031
−0.030
−0.178
−0.033
0.107
0.239
0.363
0.479
T = 55
0
2
4
6
8
10
169.1
169.1
169.2
169.4
169.6
169.8
156.1
156.0
155.9
155.9
155.9
155.9
0.465
0.466
0.467
0.468
0.469
0.471
−0.033
−0.032
−0.032
−0.032
−0.031
−0.031
−0.295
−0.090
0.106
0.285
0.451
0.604
T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
289.7
291.1
292.8
294.8
297.0
299.4
261.7
262.5
263.5
264.7
266.0
267.5
0.550
0.552
0.555
0.558
0.561
0.564
−0.033
−0.033
−0.032
−0.032
−0.031
−0.031
−0.488
−0.215
0.040
0.271
0.480
0.670
Relative Productivity of New Immigrants, γ/ (γ −m) =0
T = 40
0
2
4
6
8
10
94.6
94.9
95.2
95.6
95.9
96.3
89.0
88.7
88.5
88.2
88.0
87.8
0.405
0.406
0.406
0.407
0.407
0.408
−0.032
−0.032
−0.032
−0.032
−0.031
−0.031
−0.178
−0.001
0.171
0.331
0.483
0.625
T = 55
0
2
4
6
8
10
169.1
170.2
171.4
172.8
174.3
175.8
156.1
156.7
157.5
158.3
159.2
160.2
0.465
0.466
0.467
0.468
0.469
0.471
−0.033
−0.033
−0.032
−0.032
−0.032
−0.032
−0.295
−0.045
0.192
0.409
0.609
0.794
T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
289.7
293.2
297.2
301.7
306.7
312.1
261.7
263.9
266.4
269.2
272.4
275.8
0.550
0.552
0.555
0.559
0.562
0.566
−0.033
−0.033
−0.033
−0.032
−0.032
−0.032
−0.488
−0.156
0.149
0.424
0.671
0.896
Table 2: The impact of temporarily lowering the tax rate on asset income by 5%.
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New ∆ Debt ∆ Debt Capital Capital Initial Welfare as
Immigrants as Percent as Percent Tax Tax Change Percent of
Per of Output of Output Rate Rate in Native Permanent
Thousand at T : Long-Run before T after T Consumption Consumption
100×∆ b(T )
y(T )
100×∆ b(∞)
y(∞)
τk(t < T ) τk(t > T ) 100×
(
c(0,0)
c(0,0)
− 1
)
p∗m,γ,T
Relative Productivity of New Immigrants, γ/ (γ −m) = − 0.234
T = 40
0
2
4
6
8
10
−21.7
37.4
100.3
159.3
221.6
281.8
−22.0
36.3
94.0
145.4
198.0
248.1
0.333
0.299
0.267
0.240
0.214
0.191
0.298
0.356
0.411
0.459
0.506
0.549
−22.0
36.3
94.0
145.4
198.0
248.1
0.009
0.014
0.107
0.277
0.510
0.795
T = 55
0
2
4
6
8
10
−14.4
48.9
127.6
205.5
275.5
358.8
−14.5
47.5
119.5
186.9
245.8
315.9
0.325
0.304
0.281
0.261
0.245
0.228
0.305
0.367
0.435
0.495
0.545
0.601
−14.5
47.5
119.5
186.9
245.8
315.9
0.004
0.021
0.121
0.290
0.514
0.780
T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
−9.2
69.4
160.1
252.0
342.9
457.3
−9.3
67.0
149.1
228.2
305.1
405.0
0.322
0.306
0.290
0.276
0.264
0.251
0.311
0.385
0.461
0.529
0.590
0.660
−9.3
67.0
149.1
228.2
305.1
405.0
0.002
0.024
0.123
0.281
0.484
0.722
Relative Productivity of New Immigrants, γ/ (γ −m) =0
T = 40
0
2
4
6
8
10
−21.7
52.8
125.4
199.1
280.2
350.7
−22.0
50.8
115.9
178.5
245.3
303.6
0.333
0.291
0.256
0.225
0.195
0.173
0.298
0.370
0.430
0.485
0.541
0.587
−22.0
50.8
115.9
178.5
245.3
303.6
0.009
0.028
0.178
0.436
0.779
1.189
T = 55
0
2
4
6
8
10
−14.4
72.2
163.6
258.2
349.0
455.2
−14.5
69.2
150.7
230.5
305.7
396.5
0.325
0.297
0.272
0.250
0.232
0.214
0.305
0.387
0.461
0.528
0.587
0.651
−14.5
69.2
150.7
230.5
305.7
396.5
0.004
0.037
0.193
0.445
0.769
1.148
T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
−9.2
91.2
193.6
309.3
451.1
521.8
−9.3
87.2
177.9
275.7
396.5
460.3
0.322
0.302
0.285
0.269
0.253
0.247
0.311
0.404
0.484
0.563
0.649
0.688
−9.3
87.2
177.9
275.7
396.5
460.3
0.002
0.041
0.192
0.424
0.715
1.050
Table 3: Temporarily lowering the tax rate on asset income to maximise welfare.
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Figure 11: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm,γ,T that correspond to
different rates of immigration after temporarily lowering the tax rate on asset income for T=40,
55 or 70 years.
the long-run debt burden following a sustained period when spending on transfer payments
changes. The only difference is that now, rather than shifting the tax on labour earnings
after T to satisfy (15), at time T = 40, 55, or 70 it is the tax rate on capital that changes.
Given the way I calibrated the model, setting κ=1 and β=1, the incidence of the tax on asset
income falls most heavily on natives and the tax on labour earnings on new immigrants, so any
intratemporal shift in the burden from labour to capital is clearly not in the interests of the
native population. Furthermore, the shift to higher capital taxation in the future entails an
increase in the excess burden borne by everyone. Yet, even under these circumstances, provided
the rate of immigration is sufficiently high, the value of pm,γ,T still increases if capital taxes
ultimately rise to finance either more transfer spending or lower taxes on labour earnings, as
long as the two changes are separated by a prolonged period of deficit finance.
These caveats are important. If the rate of immigration is only two per thousand, lower
spending on transfers and lower debt is the preferred policy; reducing excess burden dominates
the small benefits that can be derived from shifting the tax burden to the future. Furthermore,
the maximum values attained by pm,γ,T in Figure 14 are much lower than in Sections 4 or 5.
The highest possible value of pm,γ,T , equivalent to a 0.502% increase in consumption, is attained
in the lowest right-hand panel of Figure 14, when transfer payments rise by 1.222% of output.
After seventy years and after the debt burden has risen by 309.4% of output, the tax on capital
must be raised to 0.612 to stabilise government finances. What if we reverse this sequence
so that lower tax rates on asset income are eventually paid for with higher taxes on labour?
Indeed, how much might natives stand to gain if sometime in the future, the instrument chosen
to replace the revenue lost from the drop from 0.32 to 0.27 in the tax rate on capital since the
early 1980’s is an increase in the taxes on wages rather than capital income?
Even in the absence of immigration, shifting the burden of taxation from the infinitely
elastic capital to inelastic labour—even if this is done with a very long lag and public debt
accumulates in the interim—generates small reductions in the excess burden that yield welfare
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Figure 12: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm,γ,T and the long-term
debt burden generated by temporarily lowering the tax rate on asset income for T=40, 55 or 70
years. Impulse responses for net the rate of return, change in basis points, for different annual
rates of immigration per thousand of zero: red, two: green, four: blue, six: black, eight: purple,
ten: brown. Overall rate of population change is 10.3 per thousand.
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Figure 13: The trajectory of the ratio of bonds to GDP values generated by temporarily lowering
the tax rate on asset income for T=70 years for different annual rates of immigration per
thousand of zero: red, two: green, four: blue, six: black, eight: purple, ten: brown. Overall
rate of population change is 10.3 per thousand. In the background in grey is the ratio of
publicly-held debt to GDP from 1970 to 2013, and the CBO’s Alternative Fiscal Scenario from
2014 to 2050.
benefits equivalent to permanently increasing consumption between 0.190% and 0.195%. Both
this effect and the shift in the incidence of the tax from native-owned capital reinforce the
benefit that accrues to the members of native households when taxes are postponed to the
future. This is why the curves in Figure 15 are uniformly higher than their counterparts in
Figure 11. Comparing the third and fourth columns in Table 2 and 4, the same decrease in
the tax on capital also implies a smaller increase in the debt burden, because the permanently
lowered tax on capital income incentivises higher investment.
Suppose again that once we factor in the difference in fertility rates between new immigrants
and the general population, the contribution of international migration to population growth is
equivalent to an effective rate of immigration of between six and eight per thousand. Assume
as well that the current low tax rates on capital income introduced in the early 1980’s are
permanent. If the debt continues to rise until 2050, before the government stabilises its finances
and does so by raising the tax on labour earnings, the value of pm,γ,T is between 0.803% and
0.977%, and possibly a bit more if the productivity of new immigrants continues to improve.
From the perspective of the initial population, those whose families were already resident in
the United States in 1981, this is a small but not inconsequential benefit. Along the way the
32
0 100 200 300 400
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
D Debt Burden
N
at
iv
eW
el
fa
re
,
p m
,
Γ
,
T
ΓHΓ-mL=-0.234, T=40
0 100 200 300 400
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
D Debt Burden
N
at
iv
eW
el
fa
re
,
p m
,
Γ
,
T
ΓHΓ - mL=0, T=40
0 100 200 300 400
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
D Debt Burden
N
at
iv
eW
el
fa
re
,
p m
,
Γ
,
T
ΓHΓ-mL=-0.234, T=55
0 100 200 300 400
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
D Debt Burden
N
at
iv
eW
el
fa
re
,
p m
,
Γ
,
T
ΓHΓ-mL=0, T=55
0 100 200 300 400
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
D Debt Burden
N
at
iv
eW
el
fa
re
,
p m
,
Γ
,
T
ΓHΓ - mL=-0.234, T=70
0 100 200 300 400
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
D Debt Burden
N
at
iv
eW
el
fa
re
,
p m
,
Γ
,
T
ΓHΓ - mL=0, T=70
Figure 14: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm,γ,T and the long-term
debt burden generated by increasing transfer payments and then raising the tax rate on asset
income in T=40, 55 or 70 years. Impulse responses for net the rate of return, change in basis
points, for different annual rates of immigration per thousand of zero: red, two: green, four:
blue, six: black, eight: purple, ten: brown. Overall rate of population change is 10.3 per
thousand.
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Figure 15: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm,γ,T that correspond to
different rates of immigration after lowering the tax rate on asset income from 0.32 to 0.27 and
then raising the tax rate on wage earnings after T=40, 55 or 70 years.
debt burden grows between 226.4% and 236.7% of output, and when added to the initial debt
burden of 22.7% is a fairly close match to the projections of the Extended Baseline Scenario in
Figure 2. Of course the monotonic relationship between more debt and higher values of pm,γ,T
in Figure 16 leaves us with the same question first raised in Section 4. What are the additional
objectives or constraints, absent from the model, that prevent policy makers from relying even
more heavily on deficit finance than is already the case?
Still, in Figure 16 we see once again a monotonic relationship between more debt and higher
values of pm,γ,T as in Figure 9 in Section 4. Unlike the temporary reductions in the tax rate on
capital income in Section 5, the permanent reductions here mean that as in Figure 9, there is a
positive monotonic relationship between the increase in long-run debt and the values of pm,γ,T
in Figure 16. In fact, because of the shift in incidence and the reduction in the excess burden of
capital income tax, the slopes are steeper. As is Section 4, recent policy clearly benefits native
households, but were this the only consideration for policy makers the debt would be climbing
even faster.
7 Discussion
In each panel in Figures 9 and 12 all the curves associated with strictly positive rates of immi-
gration decline monotonically to the left of zero on the horizontal axis. This means that if the
economy is absorbing even small numbers of immigrants, temporarily raising a particular tax
rate to accumulate surpluses before lowering that same tax after time t = T reduces welfare
for the initial population. Indeed, the higher the rate of immigration, the more such a policy
shifts the tax burden from future immigrants and towards the initial population. Hence the
higher the rate of immigration, the steeper declines in welfare the latter will experience. What
this implies is that economies that are absorbing relatively larger numbers of new immigrants
are unlikely to run sustained budget surpluses to enable future reductions in tax. Instead, as
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New ∆ Debt ∆ Debt Labour Initial Welfare as
Immigrants as Percent as Percent Tax Change Percent of
Per of Output of Output Rate in Native Permanent
Thousand at T : Long-Run after T Consumption Consumption
100×∆ b(T )
y(T )
100×∆ b(∞)
y(∞)
τh(t > T ) 100×
(
c(0,0)
c(0,0)
− 1
)
pm,γ,T
Relative Productivity of New Immigrants, γ/ (γ −m) = -0.234
T = 40
0
2
4
6
8
10
84.4
84.2
84.0
83.9
83.7
83.6
83.1
82.8
82.6
82.4
82.2
82.0
0.269
0.269
0.269
0.269
0.269
0.269
−0.033
−0.033
−0.032
−0.032
−0.031
−0.031
0.190
0.310
0.438
0.559
0.674
0.783
T = 55
0
2
4
6
8
10
143.9
144.0
144.2
144.5
144.8
145.2
141.7
141.6
141.5
141.5
141.5
141.6
0.292
0.292
0.292
0.293
0.293
0.294
−0.033
−0.033
−0.032
−0.032
−0.031
−0.031
0.192
0.358
0.527
0.684
0.830
0.967
T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
229.7
230.9
232.4
234.1
236.0
238.1
226.4
226.9
227.5
228.2
229.1
230.0
0.325
0.326
0.327
0.328
0.330
0.331
−0.033
−0.033
−0.032
−0.032
−0.031
−0.031
0.195
0.404
0.613
0.803
0.977
1.137
Relative Productivity of New Immigrants, γ/ (γ −m) =0
T = 40
0
2
4
6
8
10
84.4
84.7
85.0
85.4
85.8
86.2
83.1
83.3
83.5
83.7
84.0
84.3
0.269
0.269
0.269
0.270
0.270
0.270
−0.033
−0.033
−0.033
−0.032
−0.032
−0.032
0.190
0.345
0.505
0.659
0.805
0.945
T = 55
0
2
4
6
8
10
143.9
144.8
145.9
147.2
148.5
150.0
141.7
142.3
143.0
143.7
144.6
145.5
0.292
0.293
0.293
0.294
0.295
0.296
−0.033
−0.033
−0.033
−0.032
−0.032
−0.032
0.192
0.403
0.613
0.810
0.993
1.164
T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
229.7
232.4
235.5
239.0
242.9
247.1
226.5
228.0
229.9
231.9
234.2
236.7
0.325
0.327
0.328
0.330
0.333
0.335
−0.033
−0.033
−0.033
−0.032
−0.032
−0.032
0.195
0.460
0.717
0.952
1.167
1.364
Table 4: The impact of permanently lowering the tax rate on asset income by 5% and then
raising the tax rate on wage earnings from year T on.
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Figure 16: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm,γ,T and the long-term
debt burden generated by permanently lowering the tax rate on asset income and then raising
the rate of tax on wage earnings after T=40, 55 or 70 years. Impulse responses for net the rate
of return, change in basis points, for different annual rates of immigration per thousand of zero:
red, two: green, four: blue, six: black, eight: purple, ten: brown. Overall rate of population
change is 10.3 per thousand.
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I have demonstrated, we should expect to observe a bias in favour of postponing taxation and
deficit finance.
From its entry into World War II at the end of 1941 to the year the war ended in 1945,
the US Federal Government debt as a ratio of GDP climbed from 43.3% to 112.7%. From
then on, every year but three (1949, 1954 and 1958) the debt-to-GDP ratio declined as the US
government retired its wartime debt, until the end of 1974, when it reached a postwar low of
24.6%. During the remaining years of that decade, the debt burden was relatively stable.
The year 1981, the year President Ronald Reagan took office, was a turning point. In every
one of the subsequent 13 years, the percentage of debt to GDP rose, until it had nearly doubled
to 49.5% at the end of 1993. The tax rates on income from capital fell sharply, while the rise
in the tax on labor income offset the growth in entitlement spending. The effects of persistent
primary budget deficits were compounded by the doubling in interest payments from 1.5% to
3.0% of GDP. At first this was largely a by-product of the high interest rates introduced by the
Federal Reserve, which reflected its Chairman Paul Volker’s desire to lower inflation. Later, as
the deficits accumulated, the increased interest payments were driven by the need to finance
the growing stock of debt.
The debt burden was stable during 1994 and 1995, and then began to decline—dropping to
33.3% of GDP at the end of 2001. Interest payments tapered off as well, averaging 2.6% during
this period, while faster growth in the US economy generated even faster growth in revenues.
Most importantly, spending declined, particularly on defense. If during the period between
1981 and 1992 defense spending averaged 5.8% of GDP, during the first decade that followed
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, defense spending dropped to only 3.6%. The attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq
prompted quick increases in defense spending, though not a resumption of the rates of spending
that preceded the end of the Cold War—from 2002 to 2013 spending on defense averaged 4.0%
of GDP. At the same time revenue fell sharply, initially because President George W. Bush
lowered tax rates, but later as a consequence of the recession that began in 2008. By the end
of 2013 publicly-held debt was 72% of GDP.
Yet beyond all this, the most important and consistent feature of the US Federal budget
during the last few decades is the growth in spending on entitlement programmes, whose main
beneficiaries are the elderly. This is particularly the case for Medicare; and unlike the vagaries
of war and recession, this growth was completely predictable—a consequence of increasing life
expectancy and dropping fertility. Instead of accumulating sufficient surpluses to finance these
liabilities we observe a shift towards deficit finance that immediately follows the rapid decline
in both the rate of natural population growth in Figure 3 and the fertility rate in Figure 4.
Passage of the Medicare Modernization Act at the end of 2003 extended coverage to include
the cost of prescription drugs for the elderly from 2006 onward, and further exacerbated the
fiscal gap.
Indeed, it bears emphasising that the initial post-war rise in the debt coincided with a
sharp drop in the rate of natural population growth—concerns about a rapidly aging or even
shrinking population had replaced earlier worries about overpopulation. By 1982 the US Census
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Bureau was warning that the population was ageing rapidly and would begin contracting by
the year 2050. A year earlier, the President and Congress appointed Alan Greenspan to chair
The National Commission on Social Security Reform. The immediate task of the commission
was to prevent the near-term insolvency of the Social Security Trust Fund, but also offered
recommendations on how the programme could be stabilised for the long term, given the sharp
drop in population growth. The commission’s recommendations, which included a two-year rise
in the retirement age to be implemented by 2026, were adopted in 1983, but did little to stabilise
the programme’s long-term prospects. This was also the last time major legislation was passed,
despite the rising dependency ratio, that curtailed entitlement spending on the elderly.
Concerns about the size of the workforce and the sustainability of entitlement programmes
was also part of the motivation behind the rise in 1978 of the mandatory retirement age permiss-
able under US law from 65 years of age to 70.19 By 1986 mandatory retirement was abolished
completely. The same concerns were certainly also a factor in creating the consensus that
favoured liberalising immigration policy during the Reagan and George H. W. Bush admin-
istrations, including passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.20 Recent
projections published by the US Census predict immigration will overtake the number of births
over deaths as the source of future population growth sometime between 2027 and 2038.21
The simulations and welfare calculations in Sections 4 to 6 demonstrate that the model can
explain at least part of the motivation behind not only the accumulation of public debt in the
United States so far but even the more rapid accumulation predicted in the CBO’s Alternative
Fiscal Scenario. Indeed, in the absence of immigration, it is hard to rationalise the mere
shifting of the tax burden, particularly on capital income, across time. When the economy
is not absorbing new immigrants, the welfare loss is equivalent to lowering consumption by
−0.488% if the policy persists to 2050 in Table 2.
8 Conclusion
The decision to leave tax rates low, particularly the tax rate on capital income, and as a
consequence to continue to accumulate both formal debt and unfunded liabilities, is a political
choice. I believe my model offers at least some insight as to why for the first time in US history,
the debt burden has risen in a sustained manner during peace-time, and why there seems little
immediate prospect of a change in direction. It is of course the case that the trajectory of
US debt is the result of decision-making and political processes that are far more dynamic,
and far more contingent on unforeseen circumstances, than I assume in my model. It is very
unlikely that voters, or their representatives, are deliberately choosing policies that carefully
weigh the costs and benefits of deficit finance, as rates of migration change, in the manner of
the model. However, it is not too hard to imagine that concerns about the rising burden of
debt, and its impact on the next generation, are likely to be less persuasive at a time when
citizens are watching the composition of their societies being transformed so quickly. What my
19von Wachter (2009).
20Westoff (1986) and Wattenberg (1987).
21https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb13-89.html
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model demonstrates is merely that ceteris paribus, there is likely to be far greater willingness to
defer taxes and rely on deficit spending during periods when immigration is a more prominent
component of population growth.
That people voting for a set of tax policies in one period may not be exactly the same people
who must pay these taxes in the next is not an uncommon feature in models associated with
dynamic fiscal policy. What is different here is that by adopting the Weil (1989) framework,
I provide an alternative to the strict dichotomy between models with overlapping generations,
where agents disregard the impact of their choices on future generations, and the quasi-Ricardian
world of infinite-lived dynasties in which agents are assumed to fully participate in both the
economy and the political system in every period. In the case where taxation is distortionary,
gone also is the option to simply choose the tax that redistributes the most income to those who
can organize the most votes, while abstracting from deadweight loss. As recent experience has
shown, prolonged reliance on deficit finance has real consequences. The higher rates of future
taxation in my model are only one possible outcome, and clearly not the most dire.
The degree to which the policy choices made in any given period are informed by their effects
on future generations is hardly straightforward, even if people never move between different po-
litical jurisdictions. Concern for one’s own descendants is not the only form of intergenerational
altruism. People without children may care deeply about the welfare of future members of the
society in which they live, and do not necessarily support policies that maximise their own
welfare at the expense of the young and the unborn:
Society is indeed a contract......It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in
all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a
partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not
only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are
dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a
clause in the great primæval contract of eternal society,.....
Edmund Burke, Reflections on The Revolution In France, 1790.22
Yet most transfers between people, whether inter vivos or testamentary, take place between
members of the same family. My contention is that immigration creates a certain bias irn
favor of deficit finance, though this argument could be turned on its head; deficit finance is
what generates a preference for accomodating more immigrants. This is certainly possible,
in fact, as demonstrated in Ben-Gad (2004), the effect of immigration itself on factor returns
generates an increasing immigration surplus for the native population, so we are left to wonder
why immigration is not considerably higher. Perhaps one reason does follow directly from the
model—the faster immigrants arrive, the more natives may want the government to issue bonds
to cover immediate government expenditure, but also the greater the risk that the immigrants
will acquire the political power to repudiate that very same debt.23
22http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15679/15679-h/15679-h.htm
23One paper in which the rate of immigration is endogenously determined by voters in the destination country
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If immigration does indeed create a bias in favour of deficit finance, there is no reason to
assume the phenomenon is isolated to the United States. In many developed countries, the
transition from low rates of net migration and high rates of natural population growth to high
net migration and low, even negative, rates of natural population growth has been far more
extreme.
One last issue is emigration. At any given moment, migration flows at the national level
tend to be one-way. Only occasionally do we observe so-called ‘replacement migration’ in which
a country absorbs significant numbers of new workers even as its own native-born workers move
elsewhere. Emigration could create a bias in favor of surpluses—tax people before they leave—
but only if the rate of emigration does not exceed a certain threshold. If enough people are
leaving, or anticipate they will, they may opt to avoid taxing themselves, and leave behind their
share of the public debt to those who remain. Of course, at the sub-national and local level,
simultaneous flows of inmigration and outmigration are the normal consequence of churning
in the labor market. One implication is that as people become more mobile, we may expect
the different regions within federal states and localities to acquire higher debt and unfunded
liabilites.
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